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Abstract:
Ad-nanced TV channels are two-sided platforms where media houses provide
communication from advertisers to viewers. Most media houses air several chan-
nels, some of which are particularly valuable to advertisers. At rst glance one
might expect that the ad volumes are highest in the channels that are the adver-
tisersfavorites. However, a crucial management challenge for media houses is to
ensure that viewers go where the potential for raising advertising revenue is great-
est. Since viewers dislike ads, we show that this implies that advertising volumes
will be relatively low (and advertising prices relatively high) in the such channels.
Indeed, other things equal, the ad-volume in a channel is inversely related to its
attractiveness on the advertising market. Only if the costs of using alternative tools
to attract viewers to the advertisersfavorite channels are su¢ ciently small, will the
advertising volume in channels with high demand for ads be larger than in channels
with low demand for ads.
Keywords: advertising nanced TV, program selection, programming invest-
ments.
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1 Introduction
Ad-nanced television is a two-sided market where consumers select programs with
their eyeballs, and media houses deliver eyeballs to advertisers. Advertisers and
viewers thus interact through a platform (a media house) that accounts for the
externalities between the two groups.1 Empirical studies indicate that TV viewers
dislike ads, while advertisers prefer a large audience. In this sense there is a negative
externality from advertisers to viewers and a positive externality from viewers to
advertisers. Being interrupted by commercial breaks might thus be considered as an
implicit price that ad-averse viewers have to pay for watching TV. Consequently, it
is not surprising to nd that the variable fee for watching TV is typically zero, and
that media houses make a large share of their revenue from the advertising side of
the market.2
In general, advertisers go where TV viewers go. However, for a given number
of viewers, some TV channels (program proles) are valued more by the advertisers
than others. One reason for this is that the sales-enhancing e¤ect of an ad may
vary between channels. "People cannot be coughing and dying right before a Lucky
[Strike] ad" is the way Don Draper and his colleagues at the Sterling Cooper Ad-
vertising Agency put it (from the TV drama Mad Men, set in 1960s New York). In
a similar vein, the value of advertising for a journey to South Africa is greater in
a feel-good travel channel than in a news channel which discusses the wide-spread
violence in the country.
Our main research question is: If a given media house airs more than one channel,
and advertisers value some channels more than others, how should it set advertising
prices and advertising volumes? Using insight from one-sided markets, one might
1This feature of a two-sided market is also found in other ad-nanced media markets, where
the platform provider links the audience and the advertisers, such as newspapers, social networks
(like Facebook), search engines (Google links advertisers and searchers). See e.g., Rysman (2009)
and Parker and van Alstyne (2005) for more examples.
2The most common price structure in the TV market is one where the viewers pay a xed fee
for accessing a channel (or a bundle of channels) independent of actual viewing time. Pay-per-view
TV still has a relatively small share of the market.
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expect that the more attractive it is to advertise in a channel, the higher the chan-
nels prot maximizing advertising volume will be. Taking the two-sidedness of the
market into account, we show that the opposite may be true. A central management
challenge for a multi-channel media house is to ensure that viewers go where the
advertisers prefer them to go. We show that this implies that it is optimal to choose
ad prices such that the ad volumes in the advertisersfavorite channels are reduced
compared to channels with lower demand for ads. Other things equal, this tends to
make the channels with the highest potential for raising advertising revenue more
attractive for ad-averse viewers.
Multi-channel media rms may have alternative tools available, such as program-
ming investments, to make viewers and advertisers prefer the same channels (the
advertisersfavorites). However, unless the costs of using such alternative tools are
su¢ ciently low, multi-channel media houses should use pricing strategies which en-
sure that ad volumes are lowest in the channels with the highest demand for ads.
There is one important caveat here; if the viewers have a high willingness to shift
from one channel to another (i.e., if the audience perceives the channels as close
substitutes in terms of viewer utility), a given media house might nd it optimal to
close down the channel with the lower potential for raising advertising revenue.
Our qualitative results hold independent of whether the multi-channel media
house faces competition from other media rms. Due to the two-sided nature of
ad-nanced TV, the opportunity cost of having a high advertising level is smaller at
a channel with low demand for ads than at a channel with high demand for ads. It is
consequently optimal for the media house, also under competition from other media
houses, to charge a high advertising price and accept a low advertising volume at the
advertisersfavorite channels. An observation that one channel has more ads than
another, thus does not necessarily imply that this channel is particularly valuable
for the advertisers. Actually, it could indicate that the channel faces a relatively low
demand for ads.
2
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2 Relevant Literature
Wilbur (2008), testing a discrete choice model using US data, provides important
insights into the two-sided nature of ad-nanced TV-channels and the interplay be-
tween advertising and viewing markets. He nds that viewers are strongly ad averse,
and that a 10 % increase in advertising levels is likely to reduce audience size by
about 25 % for a highly rated network (all other things equal). Previous studies
also show that TV-viewers try to avoid advertising breaks, see e.g., Moriarty and
Everett (1994) and Danaher (1995).3 Hence, to obtain viewer demand estimates
it is crucial to control for advertising levels. Wilbur further poses the question
of whether it is the viewers or the advertisers that have the larger impact on TV
channelsprogram selection. His study does not contain a theoretical model, but
based on his empirical study he shows that the viewerstwo most preferred program
genres, Action and News, account for only 16% of network program hours, while
Reality and Comedy, which are the advertiserspreferred genres, account for 47% of
network program hours. More generally, his ndings suggest that advertisersprefer-
ences have stronger impact than viewerspreferences on media houses programming
choices. This resembles the theoretical results in the present paper.
Our article is also closely related to the literature on two-sided markets. Seminal
papers on the pricing in such markets are Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), Armstrong
(2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Economides and Katsamakes (2006), and Parker
and van Alstyne (2005).4 In general it is well known that prices in two-sided markets
depend on the set of demand elasticities and marginal costs on both sides of the
market (Rysman, 2009, Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006). This insight has important
implications for the pricing strategy in media markets. A pioneering theoretical
contribution to the two-sided nature of ad-nanced media markets is provided by
Anderson and Coate (2005), who analyze both advertising nanced TV and pure
3In other media markets consumers may not dislike ads. Kaiser and Wright (2006), for instance,
show that readers of womens magazines appreciate ads. Rysman (2004) analyzes the market for
yellow pages directories and he nds that consumersutility increases with the number of pages
with ads.
4Eisenmann et al. (2006) provide a guide to business strategies in two-sided markets.
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pay-TV. Kind et al (2009) study how competitive forces inuence the way media
rms are nanced. They nd that a media rms ability to nance content fully by
ads is constrained by the number of competitors. Godes et al. (2009) analyze how
competition between rms in di¤erent media industries, such as TV channels and
newspapers, a¤ects pricing strategies (see also Dukes and Gal-Or, 2003).5 In the
present paper we assume that the viewers can watch TV free of charge, since we
focus on how media houses should react to the interplay between advertisersand
viewerspreferences for TV content.
3 The model
We consider a context where a media house operates two channels, i = H;L; that
di¤er in their programming proles. One of the channels might for instance be a
sports channel and the other a lm channel. The time spent watching channel i is
denoted by Vi; and we follow Kind et al (2007, 2009) in assuming that the consumers
gross utility of watching TV is given by
U = (1 +QH)VH + (1 +QL)VL   1
2

4 (1  s)  V 2H + V 2L+ s (VH + VL)2 : (1)
where Qi  0 is the viewersperceived quality of the programs o¤ered by channel
i: The channels are vertically di¤erentiated if Qi > Qj, with channel i having the
higher quality: The parameter s 2 [0; 1] is a measure of the extent of horizontal
di¤erentiation: the viewers consider the TV channelsprograms as completely un-
related if s = 0; and as perfect horizontal substitutes if s = 1: More generally, the
higher s, the closer substitutes are the channels from the viewerspoint of view. Note
that the viewers do not have preferences for one channel over the other if Q1 = Q2.
Ceteris paribus, the consumers therefore prefer to use 50 % of their total viewing
time on each channel.6
5When advertiserspreferences have an impact on the quality, this obviously raise welfare issues.
Anderson and Gabzewicz (2006) discuss how advertiserspreferences may distort the newspaper
content away from the readerspreferences. We do not address welfare issues in the present paper.
6Utility function (1) is due to Shubik-Levitan (1980), and is a modication of the standard
quadratic utility function. Under the standard quadratic utility function a change in the parameter
4
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In most countries consumers pay e.g. a cable operator a xed monthly fee (F )
to get access to TV channels, which subsequently can be watched free of monetary
charges. The focus of this paper is to analyze the implications of the fact that
advertisers have a greater willingness to pay for ads in some types of programs than
in others. For simplicity we therefore abstract from the distribution layer of the TV
industry and set F = 0, but this does not a¤ect the qualitative results at which we
arrive.
Consistent with empirical data we assume that viewers have a disutility of being
interrupted by commercials. We assume that viewerssubjective cost of watching
channel i is Ci = AiVi; where Ai is the advertising level in the channel, and  > 0
is a parameter that measures the viewersdisutility from advertising. This means
that the consumer surplus from watching TV is given by
CS = U   (AHVH + ALVL): (2)
Solving Vi = argmaxCS we nd that the viewing time on each channel is given by
Vi =
1
2
+
(2  s) (Qi   Ai)  s (Qj   Aj)
4 (1  s) : (3)
Each TV channel makes prots by selling advertising space. To simplify the ex-
position, but without a¤ecting the general insights to follow, we assume that variable
production costs in a TV channel are zero. In accordance with these assumptions,
the prot function for the media house is
 = RHAH +RLAL   Q2H   Q2L ( > 0); (4)
s would a¤ect both the substitutability between the goods and the size of the market (see e.g.,
McGuire and Staelin, 1983). This is not the case with the Shubik-Levitan utility function, where s
is a unique measure of channel substitutability. Our qualitative results would go through also with
the standard quadratic utility function, but then an increase in s would both reduce the size of
the market and increase the substitutability. This makes it more di¢ cult to perform comparative
statics. See Motta (2004) for a general discussion of the advantages of the Shubik-Levitan utility
function over the standard quadratic utility function. Specic applications of the Shubik-Levitan
utility function are for instance Sha¤er (1991) and Foros, Hagen and Kind (2009).
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where Ri is the price that the advertiser has to pay for an advertising slot on channel
i. The term Q2i captures the channels cost of investing in programming quality.
In practise this could be the costs of buying programs which the audience nds
attractive (like popular baseball matches or movies). For simplicity we treat this as
a continues variable.
Let Aki denote advertiser ks advertising level in channel i. It is reasonable to
assume that the advertisers gross gain from advertising is increasing in its advertis-
ing level and in the number of viewers. To make it simple we let the gross gain be
equal to iAkiVi; where i is a positive constant - the larger i; the more attractive
is channel i for the advertisers. This implies that the net gain for advertiser k from
advertising on TV equals
k =
X
i
(iAkiVi   AkiRi) ; k = 1; ::; n; (5)
where n is the number of advertisers, and Ri is the price that the advertiser has to
pay for an advertising slot on channel i.
Below, we consider a three-stage game. At stage 1, the media house determines
advertising prices (Ri) and quality investments (Qi): At stage 2 the advertisers
choose how much advertising space to buy, and at stage 3 the consumers decide
their viewing time on each channel. We solve the game by backward induction, and
the solution to the nal stage is given by equation (3).
At stage 2 we solve @k=@Aki = 0, and nd that advertiser ks demand for
advertising on channel i as
@k
@Aki
= 0 => Ri = iVi +

iAki
@Vi
@Aki
+ jAkj
@Vj
@Aki

: (6)
Abstracting from the terms in the bracket on the right-hand side of equation (6), we
see that the willingness to pay for an ad on channel i is proportional to the size of
the audience (Ri  Vi): However, a higher advertising level on channel i makes that
channel less attractive for the TV viewers and the other channel more attractive.
These e¤ects are captured by the terms @Vi
@Aki
=   (2 s)
4(1 s) < 0 and
@Vi
@Aki
= s
4(1 s) > 0:
7
7Note that the absolute value of these e¤ects is increasing in s: This captures the fact that the
6
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We shall assume that each advertiser is a price taker in the sense that he ra-
tionally disregards the possibility that his advertising volume has any e¤ect on the
attractiveness of the TV channels (meaning that the square bracket in (6) equals
zero). This amounts to assuming that the number of advertisers (n) is innitely
large:
Assumption 1: Let n!1:
Solving (6) and using (3) we nd that aggregate demand for advertising at each
channel equals
Ai =
1


1 +Qi   (2  s) Ri
i
  sRj
j

: (7)
Equation (7) shows that the demand curve for advertising is downward-sloping,
@Ai=@Ri < 0, and more interestingly, that the demand for advertising on channel
i is decreasing in channel js advertising prices (@Ai=@Rj < 0). The reason is that
viewersdislike ads. Therefore, if the price of an ad slot (Rj) increases, the ad level
on channel j falls making channel j more attractive to viewers. Channel i; on the
other hand, ends up with a smaller audience and a lower demand for advertising.
In our model we have assumed that the viewers do not have preferences for one
channel over the other. This assumption is made to bring forward as clearly as
possible the advertisersinuence on the audienceallocation of viewing time across
the two channels . To capture the fact that a certain type of program prole is more
valuable to advertisers, we assume that channel H is preferred by advertisers in the
sense that advertisersgross gains from advertising on channel H are higher than
on channel L, that is,
Assumption 2: H > L:
Not surprisingly, equation (7) makes it clear that advertising demand for channel
i is increasing in i (@Ai=@i > 0) and decreasing in j (@Ai=@j < 0): We thus
note:
better substitutes the public perceives the channels to be, the more willing they are to shift from
a channel with a high advertising level to a channel with a low advertising level.
7
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Remark 1: Other things equal, there is a larger demand for advertising in the
H-channel than in the L-channel.
3.1 Without quality investments
We start out by assuming that the media house cannot make any programming
investments (QH = QL = 0): At stage 1 the media house thus solves fRH ; RLg =
argmax: The corresponding rst-order condition is
@
@Ri
=

Ai +Ri
@Ai
@Ri

+Rj
@Aj
@Ri
= 0: (8)
The term in the squared bracket on the right hand side depicts the usual change in
marginal revenue following a change in the price Ri of advertising: A higher price
increases the prot margin at channel i; but it also causes advertising sales for
channel i to fall (@Ai=@Ri < 0). Non-standard is the last term on the right hand
side. It exhibits how advertising demand for channel j responds to a rise in the
ad price of channel i. From equation (7) it follows that the demand for ad slots on
channel j falls when the price of ad slots on channel i rises, that is @Aj=@Ri < 0: This
e¤ect makes it clear that multi-channel media houses tend to set lower advertising
prices than media houses which only operate one channel.
Solving (8) simultaneously for the two channels, and inserting for Ai from equa-
tion (7), we obtain the optimal price for ads in channel i as
Ri =
(4  3s) i   js
N1
ij; (9)
where N1 > 0 whenever the second-order conditions and non-negativity constraints
hold (see the Appendix).
Combining (3), (7) and (9), assuming that both channels are aired, we have that
Ai =
2 (1  s) 4i   s  i   j j
N1
and Vi =

(4  3s) i   js

j
N1
: (10)
Lessons from one-sided markets indicate that the more attractive it is to advertise
on a channel, the more ads will it contain. In particular, one might expect that if
8
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initially H = L = ; then a small increase in the attractiveness of channel H will
increase the ad-volume of that channel. Rather surprisingly, the opposite is true:
Proposition 1: If we start from the position that both channels are equally
attractive to advertisers (H = L = ) ; increasing the gross gain to advertisers of
advertising on channel H leads the management of the multi-channel media house
to reduce the ad volume of channel H and increase the ad volume of channel L;
@AiH
@H

H=L=
=   1
16
s

< 0 and
@AiL
@H

H=L=
=
1
8
s

> 0 :
Hence, if the gross gain from advertising on the high-value channel increases, the
media house will reduce the amount of advertising on that channel and increase the
amount of advertising on the other channel. The reason is that the media house
thereby attracts more viewers to the H channel when the audience dislikes ads.
Consistent with this result, we nd from equation (10) that
AH   AL =  
 
2H   2L
 2s (1  s)
N1
< 0:
Even though by assumption demand for ads is higher for channel H than for channel
L (c.f. Remark 1), it will thus have a lower advertising level.
Wilburs nding that a 1 % reduction in a channels ad level might increase the
size of its audience with 2.5 % (see Wilbur, 2008) indicates that adjustment of ad
levels could be an e¤ective tool to attract viewers. A further gain for the media
house of using this strategy is that it reallocates viewers from the channel where the
advertisers have a low willingness to pay for ads to the channel where they have a
high willingness to pay. Formally, using equations (9) and (10) we have:
RH  RL = (H   L)
2HL (2  s)
N1
> 0
(11)
VH   VL = (
2
H   2L) s
N1
> 0
Summing up, we have:
9
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Proposition 2: When the media house does not invest in program quality
(QH = QL = 0) ; and both channels are aired, the channel with the greater value
for advertisers (channel H) has:
(i) More viewers (VH > VL)
(ii) Higher advertising prices (RH > RL)
(iii) Lower advertising volume (AH < AL).
Note that the closer substitutes the channels are from the audiences point of
view, the more willing the viewers are to shift from one channel to the other. Since
the H-channel is the most protable one for the media house, it can be shown that
it is optimal to close down the L-channel if the consumers perceive the channels to
be close substitutes:
Corollary 1: When QH = QL = 0; the low-value channel (L) will not be aired
if the two channels are su¢ ciently close horizontal substitutes, that is, if
s > scrit  4L
nH + 3L
3.2 With quality investments
In this section the media house determines both the advertising price (Ri) and
programming investments (Qi) at stage 1. Compared to the previous section the
media house now has an additional tool available to a¤ect the absolute and relative
attractiveness of the two channels. The game structure is the same as before, and
the outcomes at stage 3 and stage 2 of the game are still given by (3) and (7),
respectively.
Solving fRi; Qig = argmax at stage 1 we obtain the following rst-order con-
ditions for optimal ad prices and investment levels:
Ri = 2ij
2

i (4  3s)  js

  ij
N2
(12)
and
Qi = ij
2

4i (1  s)  s
 
j   i

  ij
N2
; (13)
10
SNF Working Paper No. 43/10
where N2 > 0 (see the Appendix).
Inserting (12) and (13) in (3) and (7), we derive expressions for the ad levels and
the size of the audiences as
Ai = 4j
2 (1  s) 4i   s  i   j  ij
N2
(14)
Vi = 2j
2

i (4  3s)  js

  ij
N2
: (15)
Note that advertisers do not care about the channelsquality levels per se. How-
ever, other things equal, the higher a channels quality level, the more viewers it
attracts, and the larger the demand for advertising. Since the media houses incen-
tives to make quality investments are positively related to the advertiserswillingness
to pay for an ad,we nd from the rst-order conditions that the H-channel has a
higher quality level than the L-channel:
QH  QL = 4HL (H   L) (2  s)
N2
> 0:
Using the conditions above, we can show that the advertising price and the
number of viewers are higher for the H-channel than for the L channel, that is,
RH   RL > 0 and VH   VL > 0. This result is similar to what we found when the
media house could not invest in program quality (confer Proposition 2 for s > 0):
However, the costs of quality investments determine which channel that will have
the higher ad volume:
Proposition 3: When the media house invests in program quality and both
channels are aired, the channel with the greater value for advertisers (channel H)
has:
(i) More viewers (VH > VL)
(ii) Higher advertising prices (RH > RL)
(iii) Lower advertising volume (AH < AL) if  > 
  HL=2s (1  s)  (H + L).
Proposition 3 makes it clear that when the media house can use both ad levels and
quality investments to enhance the attractiveness of a channel, both instruments are
11
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used in favor of the channel that is valued the most by the advertisers. Advertisers,
therefore, implicitly determine investments in program quality as well as the level of
ads in the two channels. At the heart of this strategy is the insight that it is crucial
for a media house to make viewers and advertisers prefer the same channel.
In the Appendix we prove part (iii) of Proposition 3, which shows that the
media house will undertake programming investments such that the advertising
level at channel H is higher than at channel L if  < . The relationship between
investment costs and advertising levels is illustrated in Figure 1, where we have
assumed that H = 1:5; L = 1:0 and s = 0:5. The gure shows that the advertising
volume at the H-channel is higher than at the L-channel if and only if investment
costs are su¢ ciently small ( <   1:2): Otherwise, the channel which is preferred
by the advertisers has the lower advertising volume.
0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
A
L
A
H
f
A
L
A
H
0.50
0.54
0.58
0.62
0.66
0.70
Figure 1: Advertising levels with investments.
Recall that in absence of quality investments, we found that if the audience
perceives the TV channels to be su¢ ciently close horizontal substitutes (s > scritinv ),
the media house would close down the low-value channel. In the present case we
have:
Corollary 2: With quality investments, the low-value channel will not be aired
if the two channels are su¢ ciently close horizontal substitutes, that is, if
s > scritinv  scrit  
LnH
2 (nH + 3L)
12
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Other things equal, the number of viewers will be smaller with one than with
two channels. However, the more the media house invests in programming quality
for the H-channel, the fewer viewers it loses by closing down channel L. Therefore,
it is protable for the media house to close down the low-value channel even if the
other channel is a relatively poor substitute. On the expenditure side, it should be
noted that this tends to reduce the media-housetotal investment costs.
4 Extension: Competition among media houses
Above we have demonstrated that a manager of a media house which runs at least
two channels should sell the lowest volume of advertising space on the channel with
the highest advertising demand, other things equal. This is due to the two-sided
nature of the TV-industry. So far we have only analyzed the case where the media
house faces no competition from other TV channels. However, the qualitative results
survive also with competition, and independent of whether competing media houses
control one or several channels. This is clear since the rst-order conditions for
optimal advertising prices derived above (equation (8)) do not hinge on the media
house being in a monopoly situation. In particular, consider an arbitrary media
house k which runs one H channel and one L channel. Even if the media house
faces competition, we still have that @k
@Rki
= 0 implies
Aki +Rki
@Aki
@Rki
+Rkj
@Akj
@Rki
= 0: (i; j = H;L; i 6= j):
where the third term on the left-hand side is negative; Rkj
@Akj
@Rki
< 0:
Recall from equation (8) that the sign of this term reects the fact that a higher
advertising price at channel i reduces the advertising volume in that channel, and
thus shifts viewers from channel j to channel i. Thereby advertising demand for the
j-channel falls. Important in this respect is that the higher the willingness to pay
for an ad on the j-channel is, the greater the subsequent loss will be for the media
house. The opportunity cost of setting a high price for advertising is thus smaller
at the H-channel than at the L-channel. It is consequently optimal for the media
13
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house, also under competition, to charge a high advertising price and accept a low
advertising volume at channel H:
In the appendix we provide an illustration of this through an example where we
have two media houses, each controlling one H-channel and one L channel (this
symmetry is chosen only to simplify the algebra). Otherwise, the model is the same
as in Section 2. We then show the following:
Proposition 4: Assume competition between two media houses, each having one
H-channel and one L-channel. The channel with the greater value for advertisers
(channel H) has the lower advertising volume if
 >  =
(2  s) HL
4s (1  s) (H + L)
:
Independent of whether we have competition, we thus cannot infer that channels
with high advertising levels are particularly valuable to advertisers. On the contrary,
the opposite may be true. What we should expect, though, is that programming
investments are higher the more attractive a channel is to the advertisers (even
though the advertisers do not care about programming quality per se). In this
sense it is advertiser preferences rather than viewer preferences which determine
broadcastersquality levels.
5 Some concluding remarks
Television absorbs a quarter of all advertising expenditures in the US. Given the
fact that the average American spends over four and a half hours a day watching
television, the scope for prot among advertisers and media houses is vast. The
business model of media houses must take into account the externalities that arise
between advertisers and viewers, and this yields some paradoxical results compared
to what one might expect using insight from one-sided markets.
The driving force behind our results is that multi-channel media houses must try
to transfer viewers from channels where demand for ads is low to channels where
demand for ads is high. As a consequence, media houses will choose e.g. advertising
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levels and investments in programming quality so as to make the viewers watch
the advertiserspreferred channels. Our results thus t well with recent empirical
evidence by Wilbur (2008), who, based on US ad-nanced television, nds that
advertisers have a stronger impact than viewers on networks program selection.
A question for future research, then, is how this will inuence the TV industrys
business models in the future. In particular, technological changes have signicantly
increased the scope for charging the consumers directly for watching TV. With
viewerspreferences being muted in advertising-nanced networks, this should give
rise to a competitive advantage for channels nanced by a pay-per-view business
model. Such alternative business models may lead TV channels to respond better
to the program selection preferred by the viewers and to their willingness to pay
for quality.
6 Appendix
6.1 Without quality investments
Proof that N1 > 0 in the relevant area
Solving fRH ; RLg = argmax we nd equations (9) and (10), where N1 
16HL (1  s)  s2 (H   L)2 : Di¤erentiation of N1 yields
dN1
dH
= 16L (1  s)  2s2 (H   L) ;
which means that the denominator N1 is decreasing in H of H > L: From (10) we
nd that VL = 0 for H  4 3ss L: Since N1jH= 4 3ss L = 16
2
L (1  s) (2  s)2 =s > 0;
it follows that N1 is positive in the relevant area. Q.E.D.
6.2 With quality investments
Proof that N2 > 0 in the relevant area
Solving fRi; Qig = argmax we nd (12) and (13), where
N2  42
 
16HL (1  s)  s2 (H   L)2

2   4HL (H + L) (2  s)+ 2H2L
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The second-order conditions require that H1   2 < 0; H2  42 > 0; H3i 
 24(2 s) j
2j
< 0 and H4  N22H2L4 > 0: Note that H3i < 0 if j < 4 (2  s) ;
using equation it can be shown that a higher value of j makes Vi < 0: H3i is thus
negative if both channels have non-negative audiences. Moreover, the Hessians H1;
H2 and H4 clearly have the required signs whenever  > 0 and N2 > 0:Q:E:D:
Proof that VH > VL and RH > RL
From (15) and (12) we nd that
VH   VL = 2 [2s (H + L) + HL] (H   L)
N2
> 0 and
RH  RL = 8HL
22 (2  s) (H   L)
N2
> 0;
such that the size of the audience and the advertising price is higher for the H-
channel than for the L-channel also with quality investments. Q:E:D:
Proof of part (iii) of Proposition 3:
From (14) we nd
AH   AL = 4 (H   L) [HL   2s (1  s) (H + L)]
N2
;
which means that AL > AH if and only if  =
HL
2s(1 s)(H+L) : Note that this is
equivalent to stating that AL > AH if
1
2
 
1 
s
 (H + L)  2HL
 (H + L)
!
< s <
1
2
 
1 +
s
 (H + L)  2HL
 (H + L)
!
:
It is thus for su¢ ciently high values of  and "intermediate values" of s that the
advertising level might be higher for the L-channel than for the H channel. Q:E:D:
Prots are then strictly increasing in s
Inserting for equilibrium advertising prices and quality investments into the me-
dia houseprot function when both channels are operative, we nd that
 = 2HL
4 (1  s) (H + L)  HL
N2
:
We thus have
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@
@s
=
1632HL (2  s) [2s (H + L) + HL]
N22
(H   L)2 > 0;
which makes it clear that aggregate prots are increasing in s unless H = L: It
is further straight forward to show that aggregate prots are increasing in s if only
one channel is operative (independent of whether H is greater than L). Q:E:D:
6.3 Competition among media houses
Proof of Proposition 4:
With two media houses running each their H-channel and L-channel we must
modify (1) to
U =
2X
i=1
[(1 +QiH)ViH + (1 +QiL)ViL] 2
 
(1  s)
2X
i=1
 
V 2iH + V
2
iL

+
s
4
2X
i=1
(ViH + ViL)
2
!
:
This implies that
V1H =
1
4
+
(4  s) (Q1H   A1H)  s (Q1L   A1L +Q2H   A2H +Q2L   A2L)
16 (1  s) ;
with similar expressions for V1L; V2H and V2L: Thereby demand for ads equals
A1H =
1


1 +Q1H   (4  3s) R1H
H
  s

R1L
L
+
R2H
H
+
R2L
L

;
with similar expressions for A1L; A2H and A2L
Maximizing prots for the two media houses with respect to advertising levels
and quality investments we nd a symmetric equilibrium. Omitting subscripts for
each media house, we have (with j = H;L)
Qj =
2

(8  7s) j   s j
  j j
N3
j j; and Rj = 2
2

(8  7s) j   s j
  j j
N3
j j;
where
N3 = 8
2

8HL (1  s) (4  s)  s2 (H   L)2

2 2HL (8  5s) (H + L)+2H2L:
Advertising levels are then given by
Aj = 4 j
4 (1  s) j (8  5s) + s j  j j (2  s)
N3
;
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which in turn implies that
AH   AL =  4 (H   L)
4s (1  s) (H + L)  H L (2  s)
N3
;
such that AL > AH if  > 
 = (2 s)HL
4s(1 s)(H+L) :Q:E:D:
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